Introduction
A decade and a half into the twenty-first century and Asia's security setting looks quite different from the world of 1998, when the United States made a long term commitment to maintaining the essence of its Cold War strategy in the region (Department of Defense 1998). The economic growth of China has fuelled an expansion in its ambition and military capacity. America's strategic decline on the back of its costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan seems to have been accelerated by the Great Recession. India is ramping up its military spending, while Japan is taking ever more steps to adopt a more effective military and defence posture. Defence expenditure across the region is on the rise, with significant modernization and offensive capability acquisition programmes evident. As a result, many believe that Asia is in the process of developing a dramatically new security order from that which has prevailed since the mid-1970s.
Yet are things actually as different as many think? The main security challenges the region faces are much as they have been for at least a generation. Asia's traditional security flashpoints -Kashmir, Taiwan, the Korean peninsula -have been points of risk since the 1950s, while nuclear proliferation has been a concern since the 1970s. The major powers, most particularly China and the US, continue to set the tone and tenor of the region's strategic setting and while there are many multilateral mechanisms, they still have virtually no influence on state security policy choices. Are things really so different? Perhaps the most important new feature of the current period is the strong sense of uncertainty about the future strategic setting and in particular questions that now exist about the long-run role that the US is likely to play.
What impact does this sense of unease about a fundamental feature of the region's setting have on the broader patterns of Asia's international relations?
Ostensibly, the purpose of theory is to answer these kinds of questions. In the place of a kind of casual empiricism, theory provides frameworks with which to make sense of complex social events. So what does the theoretical debate about Asia's security order tell us about questions of continuity, change and uncertainty? On the whole, theorists tend to agree that there is less change than may at first appear but they are more divided on what the consequences are of these changes. This reflects the wide array of theoretical perspectives that are competing for influence in the field. More broadly, the nature of theoretical debate around Asia's regional order itself reflects the uncertainty in the region with the pluralization of theoretical perspectives being driven by the region's distinct circumstances. The aim of this chapter is thus to provide an overview of this theoretical debate so as to elucidate these different perspectives, and to provide a theoretical foundation for the discussion of regional order and uncertainty in the following chapters in the book. The chapter argues that theoretical divergence is a function of the limitations of International Relations (IR) theory when applied to contemporary Asia, but also the genuine novelty of Asia's evolving international system. Given these circumstances the discipline's more eclectic theoretical perspectives appear better placed to make sense of regional uncertainty than more traditional paradigmatic approaches.
Realist approaches to security order
Approaches to Asian security that focus on the distribution of military power have historically been the most influential in both scholarly and policy terms. For many it is the forward deployment of the US military in Asia that has kept the region free of major conflict since the mid1970s. By managing the strategic balance, the US has underwritten the security and stability of East Asian states and societies. This perspective is, unsurprisingly, strongly evident in the strategic policy statements of the US and its key regional partners (see, e.g. Department of Defence, Australia 2013, p. 10; Ministry of Defence, Japan 2013). This conventional wisdom sees the dynamics of the balance of military power among Asia's states as the crucial determinant of peace and prosperity in the region (see generally, Goldstein 2003).
The stability created by the American military presence is thought to rest on three pillars. First, the US has deterred others from using force
